Analysis Report on National Power Comparison Between the US and China in a Hypothetical “Hot War” Scenario
I. Executive Summary
This report aims to deeply analyze the national power comparison between the United States and China, excluding weapon systems, in a hypothetical “hot war” scenario. The analysis covers multiple dimensions, including politics, economy, culture, industrial capacity, and war potential, with the goal of providing a comprehensive and objective assessment for senior strategic decision-makers and researchers.
The analysis reveals that while the U.S. political system faces challenges of polarization, its inherent democratic resilience and extensive network of allies still constitute significant advantages, although “America First” policies may raise allies’ doubts about its long-term commitment. China, with its highly centralized political system, demonstrates the ability to make rapid decisions and mobilize resources in the early stages of a crisis, but the lack of bottom-up feedback mechanisms may limit its adaptability in a prolonged conflict.
Economically, the U.S. consumer-driven economy, dominated by the service sector, may face inflation and livelihood pressures if global supply chains are disrupted. China’s vast industrial production capacity is the cornerstone of its war potential, but its export-oriented economic model and real estate and local government debt issues could lead to internal instability in the face of economic warfare.
Culturally, internal cultural divisions in the U.S. could be exploited by adversaries to undermine domestic cohesion, and a weakening of its soft power might affect international support. China, on the other hand, can rally public support through nationalist narratives, but over-reliance on information control could lead to a rapid reversal of public opinion if the war goes unfavorably, impacting social stability.
In terms of industrial capacity, China, as the global manufacturing hub, possesses significant production advantages and a military-civil fusion strategy, enabling it to rapidly expand military production. However, its reliance on external sources for high-end technologies remains a potential weakness. While the U.S. has seen manufacturing offshoring, its innovation capabilities and the potential for its defense industrial base to adapt should not be underestimated, despite challenges in capacity and skilled labor.
Regarding war potential, both countries possess vast human resources. The U.S. has advantages in energy and food reserves, but supply chain resilience faces challenges. China dominates in critical minerals like rare earths and is actively building energy and food security systems. Cyber and space domains have become new battlegrounds, with both nations actively developing related capabilities that could profoundly impact military operations and critical infrastructure.
Overall, both countries possess unique strengths and significant weaknesses in a potential conflict. The U.S. advantages lie in its alliance system, financial resilience, and technological innovation leadership, but its domestic political divisions and industrial hollowing-out are challenges. China’s strengths are its immense industrial production capacity, unified political will, and control over critical resources, but its structural economic problems, reliance on external markets, and potential drawbacks of information control are its disadvantages. A “hot war” would be costly and could have profound implications for the global order.
II. Introduction
A. Purpose and Scope
This report aims to provide a foundational assessment of the national power of the United States and China, beyond direct weapon systems comparisons, in a hypothetical “hot war” scenario. The analysis will focus on the deeper dimensions that underpin national strength, including political stability, economic resilience, cultural cohesion, industrial production capabilities, and overall war potential. The objective of this report is to offer a comprehensive, objective, and authoritative perspective for senior strategic decision-makers and researchers, with a view to informing strategic planning.
B. Context of US-China Relations
As the world’s largest developed and developing nations, respectively, the relationship between the United States and China is experiencing increasingly intense strategic competition, manifested across economic, technological, and geopolitical domains. This competition has escalated into trade disputes, attempts at technological decoupling, and increased military activities in critical areas such as the Taiwan Strait. Understanding the non-military foundations of national power is crucial when assessing the long-term sustainability and outcomes of any potential large-scale conflict.
III. Political Landscape
A. Governance and Decision-Making
United States
The United States operates under a democratic system, with inherent checks and balances designed to prevent excessive concentration of power. However, this system is currently facing significant challenges from political polarization. This polarization has led to sharp, antagonistic divisions between opposing political parties, hindering effective governance and fostering distrust. Public discourse has become increasingly confrontational, with compromise often viewed as a sign of weakness.
In a crisis, democracies often appear slow to make decisions due to the need for deliberation and consensus. However, some academic perspectives argue that democratic systems possess unique resources for responding to emergencies and crises through their institutional flexibility, accountability, and information flow. Yet, the current high degree of polarization in the U.S. could impede swift and unified action during a crisis. This political polarization may lead to an “us vs. them” mentality, making it easier to demonize opponents. While public support for military deployment in domestic unrest has surprisingly shown no significant partisan bias, deeper societal divisions could undermine the national unity required for a prolonged external conflict. The U.S. military itself tends to resist domestic deployment, indicating a professional norm that might conflict with political pressures during a crisis. Therefore, a highly polarized domestic environment could lead to fragmentation of public consensus on war aims and sustainment, weakening the political will needed for a prolonged conflict, even if initial military actions garner broad support. This internal friction might be a more significant vulnerability than external threats.
China
China operates under a highly centralized, one-party authoritarian system, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintaining tight control. Chinese strategists believe they can effectively control all aspects of military escalation and manage crises through a highly procedural and scientific approach. This over-reliance on theoretical underpinnings could make them overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict, increasing the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States.
While the system offers advantages in career incentives and long-term decision-making, it lacks bottom-up accountability and institutionalized oversight, making it difficult to quickly detect and correct errors or abuses of power. This could lead to overreactions in a crisis and result in weaker systemic resilience compared to more open systems. China’s highly centralized system may enable rapid decision-making and resource mobilization in the initial stages of a conflict. However, the lack of robust internal feedback mechanisms and suppression of dissent could hinder adaptive learning and course correction in a prolonged, unpredictable conflict. The tendency for “overreaction” in a crisis might lead to miscalculations or an inability to adjust strategies in the face of unforeseen challenges, potentially prolonging the conflict or escalating its costs. Thus, despite its apparent decisiveness, the rigidity of China’s system and the potential for information distortion could be critical weaknesses in a dynamic, high-stakes “hot war,” where continuous adaptation and accurate information flow are paramount.
B. International Alliances and Diplomatic Influence
United States
The United States possesses an extensive network of diplomatic relations and formal treaties, including NATO, the Organization of American States, NORAD (with Canada), and ANZUS (with Australia and New Zealand). These alliances are considered crucial for deterring war and winning conflicts. U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific are the cornerstone of its strategy to maintain regional stability and deter aggression, providing access, interoperability, and shared capabilities that amplify American power. The U.S. maintains over 800 military bases globally.
However, concerns exist regarding the U.S.’s commitment to multilateralism, which is seen as ambivalent and selective, often adopting an “exceptionalist” stance in international treaties. The “America First” approach pursued by some administrations can leave allies feeling “blindsided,” raising questions about U.S. reliability and potentially creating opportunities for adversaries to fill power vacuums. For instance, recent actions like freezing foreign aid are eroding trust and partnerships. While the U.S. benefits significantly from its extensive alliances, its historical tendency to “vacillate between isolationism and full engagement” combined with recent “America First” policies, could lead to uncertainty among allies regarding sustained support in a prolonged “hot war.” Allies might hesitate to fully commit if they perceive the U.S. as unreliable or the conflict’s costs as too high, potentially leading to a fragmentation of the allied front. Therefore, the strength of U.S. alliances depends not only on military interoperability but also on the perception of long-term political commitment and shared responsibility, especially when conflict imposes severe economic or social costs on allies.
China
China is strengthening its relationships with countries like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which, while not as institutionalized as NATO, have demonstrated strong mutual support for military efforts. China has also established “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with nations such as Nigeria, including military support and training. China actively enhances its international influence through extensive diplomatic engagement and global initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly by leveraging discontent with the U.S.-led world order. The BRI has provided infrastructure development and economic opportunities to numerous countries, especially in the developing world, enhancing China’s image as a responsible global actor.
China meticulously cultivates its soft power through cultural exports (films, TV series, games), digital platforms, language promotion, technological advancements (AI, 5G, green technologies), and active diplomacy (BRI, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid). China possesses the world’s largest diplomatic network. However, these efforts face criticism regarding data privacy, censorship, human rights, and intellectual property protection, which pose ongoing challenges to its global image. Some commentators argue that China’s soft power is based on manipulation rather than genuine persuasion. China’s approach to the international order aims to reduce its vulnerability to U.S. power and increase its freedom of action, emphasizing Westphalian principles like sovereignty and non-interference. It has taken measures such as restricting exports of critical minerals in response to U.S. tariffs and export controls.
While China’s growing strategic partnerships and economic leverage (BRI) have expanded its global influence in peacetime, these relationships are often transactional and lack the deep ideological alignment or mutual defense obligations characteristic of traditional alliances like NATO. In a “hot war,” the reliability of such partnerships, especially when facing severe economic pressure or direct military threats, remains questionable. Countries might align with China for economic benefits but may not offer unconditional military support. Therefore, China’s diplomatic influence, though expanding, might be less effective in securing broad, unconditional military support in a direct “hot war” with the U.S. and its allies than it is in peacetime competition or gray-zone conflicts. The “manipulative” aspects of its soft power suggest that its foundation for building international solidarity might not be robust enough in a true international crisis.
C. Domestic Stability and Cohesion
United States
Political polarization has created deep fissures in the social and political fabric of the United States, with a significant portion of partisans viewing the opposing party as a threat to the nation’s well-being. This “us vs. them” mentality makes compromise difficult and could hinder national unity in a major conflict. The unit cohesion of the U.S. military—the bonds among soldiers that sustain their will and commitment under pressure—has been a point of contention, particularly concerning racial and gender integration. Social attraction, group prestige, and task commitment are key factors in cohesion.
Cultural conflicts within American society (e.g., between traditional and progressive values, over immigration, and gender roles) could be exploited to create internal and external groups for political purposes. China actively seeks to influence U.S. public opinion and culture, aiming to sow doubt and create division, including by supporting certain films to create rifts between U.S.-Japan allies. In a “hot war,” these pre-existing domestic cultural and political divisions could be exploited by adversaries to undermine public support for the war effort and weaken national resolve. Therefore, the significant internal disparities in the U.S. domestic cultural and political landscape pose a risk to maintaining national unity and public support, which are crucial for enduring the hardships of a prolonged war.
China
Maintaining social stability is a top priority for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), especially given the demographic trends (aging workforce, low birth rates) that pressure economic productivity and social stability. The Chinese economy faces challenges such as a real estate crisis, declining consumer demand, and high local government debt. Reports indicate factory closures, mass layoffs, and worker protests over wage issues are occurring. Additionally, there are reports of open protests against the government and discontent with the leadership. A prolonged economic downturn could lead to stagnation and test the CCP’s ability to maintain control.
Chinese nationalism is deeply rooted in a historical narrative of “shame and humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers, which the CCP claims to have overcome, thereby legitimizing its rule and territorial claims. This narrative is a powerful tool for mobilizing public support against external threats. The “century of humiliation” narrative is central to China’s political milieu and influences its foreign relations. It can be used to unite the populace and justify assertive actions. The CCP maintains strict control over information and media, shaping public opinion and suppressing dissent. This control is evident in efforts to suppress criticism and block investigations.
While nationalism can be a strong unifying force for China, especially in the face of external threats, prolonged economic difficulties and growing social discontent could erode the CCP’s legitimacy, which is partly tied to economic performance. In a “hot war,” economic disruptions (sanctions, blockades) would exacerbate these issues, potentially leading to widespread social unrest and challenging the CCP’s control. Therefore, China’s internal stability, though seemingly robust due to centralized control, might prove surprisingly vulnerable to the economic consequences of a major conflict, potentially leading to internal challenges that divert resources and attention from the war effort.
IV. Economic Foundations
A. Economic Size and Structure
United States
In 2024, the U.S. economy is approximately $29.2 trillion, with an annual growth rate of 2.8%. The U.S. has a diverse, highly developed, and private-sector-led economy, characterized by high productivity, technological innovation, and competitiveness. The service sector accounts for a large portion of GDP (76.7% in 2021) and employment, with private consumption making up 68.0% of GDP in 2022. The U.S. economy is primarily consumption-driven.
A consumption-driven economy heavily relies on the availability of goods, many of which are imported. In a “hot war,” disruptions to global supply chains would directly impact consumer goods prices and availability, potentially leading to inflation and decreased consumer confidence. This could create domestic economic instability, as demonstrated by the effects of tariffs. Therefore, while a strong consumption base is an advantage in peacetime, it could become a wartime vulnerability if supply chains are severed and domestic production cannot quickly compensate for lost imports, leading to public discontent.
China
In 2025, China’s economy, measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), is projected to surpass the U.S., reaching approximately $35.29 trillion. China’s economic development has largely been fueled by its vast industrial sector, with value-added industrial output accounting for nearly 40% of GDP in 2023, more than double that of the United States. China is the world’s largest industrial producer. China is reaching the limits of its investment-driven growth model, with household consumption significantly lagging (39% of GDP in 2023, compared to 68% in the U.S.). Despite government efforts, consumption remains weak due to real estate vulnerabilities, debt, and deflationary risks.
China’s immense industrial production capacity is a clear advantage for wartime production and mobilization. However, its historical reliance on exports and investment-driven growth means that significant disruptions to international trade (e.g., blockades, sanctions) could lead to overcapacity, factory closures, and rising unemployment. This would exacerbate existing domestic consumption weakness and debt problems. Therefore, while China’s industrial strength provides a solid foundation for military production, its economic structure’s reliance on external markets and investment could make it vulnerable to economic warfare, leading to internal economic instability and social unrest.
Table: US-China GDP Comparison (2024-2025)
Indicator
United States (2024/2025)
China (2024/2025)
Nominal GDP (trillions USD)
29.2 (2024)
18.685 (2024)
PPP GDP (trillions USD)
25.051 (2024), 25.727 (2025 proj.)
32.830 (2024), 34.340 (2025 proj.)
Annual GDP Growth Rate (%)
2.8 (2024)
5.0 (2024)
Primary Industry as % of GDP
0.9 (2021)
6.8 (2024)
Secondary Industry as % of GDP
18 (2023)
36.5 (2024)
Tertiary Industry as % of GDP
77 (2023)
56.7 (2024)
B. Trade and Global Supply Chain Impact
United States
For decades, the industrial base of the U.S. economy has hollowed out, becoming reliant on complex global supply chains. Many U.S. small and medium-sized enterprises depend on China’s low-cost, rapid manufacturing capabilities and logistics systems. Tariffs imposed on Chinese goods have increased costs for American consumers and businesses. This can lead to reduced demand for U.S.-made goods and trigger inflation. Companies have had to shift manufacturing bases, which requires time and investment costs, and faces unstable impacts on quality and efficiency.
The U.S. is using tariffs and subsidies to encourage companies to shift production domestically or to allies, aiming to build a resilient economic base. The focus is on strengthening critical supply chains through domestic manufacturing and strategic industrial policies, including energy, agriculture, medical products, and defense. The U.S.’s reliance on global supply chains, particularly for critical components, means that any disruption (e.g., blockades or cyberattacks on logistics) could severely impact its ability to sustain military operations and maintain domestic stability. The explicit goal of “rebuilding sufficient domestic capability to sustain critical sectors” indicates an acknowledgment of current vulnerabilities. Therefore, while the U.S. is working towards reshoring and diversification, its existing deep integration with global supply chains, especially with China, poses a significant strategic vulnerability for the U.S. in a “hot war” scenario, potentially affecting both military readiness and civilian livelihoods.
China
The Chinese economy is fundamentally dependent on exports. In 2024, China’s exports to the U.S. exceeded $500 billion, accounting for 16.4% of its total exports. China is actively diversifying its export channels and promoting digital and green trade to enhance its resilience against external shocks. It has also accelerated the relocation of manufacturing overseas to countries like Vietnam and Mexico to circumvent tariffs. China’s comprehensive domestic manufacturing system and industrial clusters offer unique advantages.
U.S. tariffs have led to a reduction in China’s exports to the U.S., affecting relevant industries (e.g., textiles, electronics, automobiles) and causing unemployment. In retaliation, China has also imposed its own tariffs and restricted exports of critical minerals. The economies of the U.S. and China are deeply intertwined, and a complete decoupling would be extremely costly. China’s control over critical minerals and its central role in global manufacturing allow it to “weaponize” its supply chain dominance. For example, restricting rare earth exports directly threatens U.S. high-tech and military supply chains. This creates a “circuitous reliance,” where U.S. efforts to de-Sinicize supply chains may still depend on Chinese intermediate products. Therefore, a “hot war” would transform economic interdependence from a stabilizing factor into a major area of conflict, with both sides leveraging their supply chain choke points to inflict maximum economic damage and disrupt each other’s industrial and military production.
C. Financial Resilience and National Debt
United States
The U.S. Treasury market, while generally resilient, experienced “severe dysfunction” during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. Concerns exist that dealer balance sheets are not sufficiently large and flexible to effectively intermediate this market during a “dash for cash.” U.S. national debt reached $36.22 trillion in May 2025 (124% of GDP), a new high since World War II. Interest payments on the national debt are projected to exceed defense spending. High debt levels reduce fiscal flexibility in responding to threats or economic downturns.
The escalating national debt and its servicing costs constitute a significant strategic constraint. In a “hot war,” massive military expenditures would further inflate deficits, potentially leading to a fiscal crisis, eroding confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds, and jeopardizing the dollar’s reserve currency status. This would limit the U.S.’s ability to finance a prolonged war and respond to unforeseen economic shocks. Therefore, despite its robust financial strength, the U.S.’s growing debt burden could undermine its capacity for sustained economic mobilization and global leadership in a prolonged conflict.
China
China’s financial markets face severe challenges from external shocks (e.g., trade friction, COVID-19 pandemic) and internal issues (e.g., 2015 stock market crash). However, China’s financial markets are relatively small as a share of GDP (60% compared to 140% for the U.S.) and capital controls are in place, which may offer some protection against capital flight. The Chinese economy is grappling with a real estate crisis, declining consumer demand, and high local government debt. The official fiscal deficit is around 3% of GDP, but broader figures including off-balance sheet funds suggest it could reach 8.5-9% of GDP in 2025, and potentially higher in 2026.
The Chinese government can compel banks to undertake more lending, but this severely limits their ability to lend to growth-promoting sectors and impacts their capital adequacy. The central bank has announced measures to stabilize financial markets and inject liquidity. While state control over financial markets and capital controls may offer some protection against external shocks, underlying issues like the real estate crisis and local government debt pose significant systemic risks. In a “hot war,” massive wartime financing needs could exacerbate these vulnerabilities, potentially leading to credit crunch and asset price declines if the state’s capacity to absorb losses is overwhelmed. Therefore, China’s financial system, despite state control, faces deep structural issues that could be severely tested in a prolonged conflict, potentially leading to financial crises that undermine its ability to finance the war and maintain social stability.
V. Cultural Dynamics
A. National Morale and Public Support for Conflict
United States
Public attitudes towards military deployment in domestic unrest have been surprisingly resilient and nonpartisan, with most willing to support a military response. However, political polarization can make it easier to demonize opponents and foster a sense of moral superiority, potentially fueling group mobilization for political violence. Cultural conflicts exist within American society (e.g., between traditional and progressive values, over immigration, and gender roles). These divisions can be exploited to create in-groups and out-groups for political purposes.
While initial public support for a conflict might be high, the deep political and cultural polarization in the U.S. could make it difficult to sustain national morale and public support in a prolonged, costly “hot war.” Adversaries might exploit these internal divisions through information warfare to undermine the war effort from within. Therefore, the significant internal disparities in the U.S. domestic cultural and political landscape pose a risk to maintaining national unity and public support, which are crucial for enduring the hardships of a prolonged war.
China
Chinese nationalism is deeply intertwined with a narrative of “shame and humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers, which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims to have overcome, thereby legitimizing its rule. This narrative can be a powerful tool for mobilizing public support against external threats. The “century of humiliation” narrative is central to China’s political milieu and influences its foreign relations. It can be used to unite the populace and justify assertive actions. The CCP maintains strict control over information and media, shaping public opinion and suppressing dissent. This control is evident in efforts to suppress criticism and block investigations.
While the CCP’s control over information and its cultivation of nationalism can ensure strong public support in the initial stages of a conflict, it also creates an echo chamber where alternative views are suppressed. If the war does not progress favorably or causes severe hardship, a public accustomed to narratives of strength and success might experience a rapid decline in morale and trust, potentially leading to social unrest. The lack of genuine bottom-up feedback mechanisms might prevent the leadership from accurately assessing public sentiment and making adjustments. Therefore, the highly managed nature of Chinese public opinion, while seemingly providing unity, might prove fragile in the face of unexpected wartime setbacks or prolonged suffering, potentially leading to a rapid erosion of legitimacy and social stability.
B. Soft Power and International Image
United States
The U.S. has traditionally leveraged its culture, values (openness, freedom, individualism), educational exchanges, and humanitarian aid (USAID) to shape preferences and garner international support. However, recent policies, such as the “America First” approach and freezes on foreign aid, have been criticized for eroding trust and signaling unreliability, potentially weakening U.S. influence and the international community’s willingness to cooperate. Some commentators argue that despite U.S. soft power initiatives, it has failed to be recognized as a world leader.
The decline of U.S. soft power, particularly through reduced foreign aid and being perceived as unreliable, could weaken its ability to garner international support and maintain strong alliances in a “hot war.” Without the persuasive power of soft power, the U.S. might rely more on hard power and coercion, which could further alienate potential partners and reinforce adversarial blocs. Therefore, a diminished soft power influence could lead to reduced diplomatic leverage and less cohesive international alliances in a major conflict, making it harder for the U.S. to isolate adversaries or gain broad international legitimacy for its actions.
China
China meticulously cultivates its soft power through cultural exports (films, TV series, games), digital platforms, language promotion, technological advancements (AI, 5G, green technologies), and active diplomacy (Belt and Road Initiative, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid). China possesses the world’s largest diplomatic network. However, China’s soft power efforts face ongoing challenges regarding human rights, censorship, and intellectual property protection. Some argue that China’s soft power is generated through manipulation rather than genuine persuasion.
While China’s “sharp power” (influence through manipulation and media control) and economic leverage (Belt and Road Initiative) can expand its global influence in peacetime, its lack of transparency and human rights record limit its ability to build deep, trust-based alliances that would provide unconditional support in a “hot war.” The perception of manipulation could lead to backlash if the conflict imposes significant costs on other nations. Therefore, while China’s soft power is growing in influence, it may be less effective than that of traditional democracies in building resilient and ideologically aligned alliances capable of enduring the sacrifices of a prolonged global conflict. Its influence might be more transactional, lacking resilience in severe crises.
VI. Industrial Capabilities
A. Overall Manufacturing Capacity
United States
In 2024, the U.S. accounts for approximately 15.9% of global manufacturing output. In recent decades, the U.S. has shifted towards a service-based economy, with manufacturing accounting for only 10.6% of GDP in 2021. This shift has led to a decline in its industrial base. The U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) faces severe challenges, including aging infrastructure, outdated technology, insufficient capacity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. There is a significant shortage of skilled manufacturing labor, with an aging workforce and inadequate training. The DIB largely operates in a “peacetime footing.”
The U.S. transition to a service economy and the “peacetime footing” of its Defense Industrial Base mean that its current industrial output does not reflect its potential wartime mobilization capacity. While the U.S. historically achieved massive wartime production (e.g., 300,000 aircraft and 86,000 tanks during WWII), the current DIB lacks the responsiveness and flexibility for rapid surge production. An aging workforce and supply chain dependencies further exacerbate this issue. Therefore, despite its technological leadership, the U.S. faces significant challenges in rapidly converting its industrial base to meet the demands of a large-scale “hot war,” potentially leading to shortages of critical munitions and equipment in a prolonged conflict.
China
China is the world’s largest manufacturing nation, accounting for approximately 31.6% to 35% of global manufacturing output. Its production capacity exceeds that of the next nine largest manufacturing nations combined. China’s industrial sector continues to grow robustly, driven by advancements in high-tech manufacturing and equipment production. China’s Defense Industrial Base operates on a “wartime footing” and invests in munitions and acquires high-end weapon systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States. China is the world’s largest shipbuilder, with a shipbuilding capacity roughly 230 times larger than that of the U.S. One large Chinese shipyard, such as Jiangnan Shipyard, has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined.
China’s vast manufacturing base and military-civil fusion strategy grant it a significant capability to rapidly expand military production in wartime. This production advantage allows it to quickly replenish消耗 and potentially overwhelm adversaries in terms of quantity. However, China still relies on foreign technology in critical high-tech areas (e.g., semiconductor manufacturing equipment, core components for aero-engines), which could become vulnerabilities in its supply chain during a conflict, especially if facing technological blockades.
B. Key Industrial Sectors and Technological Prowess
United States
The U.S. leads in military technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), connectivity, and autonomous systems. The Department of Defense has allocated funds for developing secure AI platforms, workforce training, and modernization to ensure the U.S. military remains at the forefront of AI-driven warfare. The U.S. maintains a lead in semiconductor design, though China is catching up in some areas. The U.S. Department of Defense heavily relies on Chinese supply chains for critical minerals, such as rare earth elements, gallium, germanium, antimony, tungsten, and tellurium, which are essential for over 80,000 distinct parts across 1,900 weapon systems. China’s export restrictions on these minerals could directly impact the U.S. defense industry’s production capacity.
The U.S. maintains a technological edge in semiconductors and advanced electronics, which are the technological backbone of modern defense systems. However, its reliance on critical minerals from China is a significant strategic vulnerability. If China restricts exports of these minerals during a conflict, it would directly impact U.S. military production and sustainment capabilities, potentially leading to “empty bins” issues. While the U.S. is working to onshore production and diversify sourcing, fully eliminating this dependency in the short term remains challenging.
China
China has made significant strides in semiconductors, particularly in mature-node chip production, and plans to capture a larger share of global capacity by 2030. Despite U.S. export controls, China has also made notable progress in advanced chip technology, such as Huawei’s 7-nanometer chipset. China is rapidly developing in emerging defense technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, 5G, advanced nuclear technology, and aerospace technology. However, China still has technological gaps in critical high-tech areas such as aero-engines, exemplified by reliability issues with the WS-10 engine and mass production challenges for the WS-15, which keeps it reliant on Western technology for civilian aviation.
U.S. export controls on chips aim to hinder China’s progress in AI and military innovation. While these measures have seen some short-term success, they have also spurred China’s all-out commitment to semiconductor self-sufficiency and could lead to the development of breakthrough technologies. This “forcing effect” might result in China achieving technological leaps in certain areas, thereby eroding the U.S.’s long-term technological lead. However, China still has significant weaknesses in high-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment (e.g., lithography machines), which limits its capabilities in producing the most advanced chips.
C. Defense Industrial Base Readiness and Mobilization Potential
United States
The U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) lacks the capacity, responsiveness, flexibility, and surge capability to meet the U.S. military’s production and warfighting needs. Aging infrastructure, outdated technology, skilled labor shortages, and supply chain vulnerabilities are major issues. The Department of Defense is working to accelerate defense procurement and revitalize the DIB through reforms in acquisition processes, prioritizing commercial solutions, and leveraging existing authorities like the Defense Production Act.
The U.S. Defense Industrial Base largely operates on a “peacetime footing,” in stark contrast to China’s “wartime footing” DIB. This means the U.S. might struggle to rapidly convert industrial capacity to military production in a large-scale “hot war,” leading to shortages of munitions and critical systems. While the U.S. has historical experience with massive mobilization during WWII, the global interconnectedness of the modern economy and the hollowing out of domestic manufacturing make such rapid transformation more challenging.
China
China is transitioning its National Defense Mobilization System (NDMS) from an emergency response and economic subsidization tool to a war-oriented system. Since 2015, China has initiated a series of reforms to prioritize war mobilization capabilities, including the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) assuming control over government mobilization planning and military support. China has also enhanced the NDMS through legislation and structural reforms, enabling it to convert political, economic, technological, cultural, social, and other civilian resources from peacetime to wartime use, thereby strengthening military logistics.
China’s Defense Industrial Base operates on a “wartime footing” and is outpacing the U.S. in producing and acquiring advanced weapon systems. Its vast manufacturing scale and military-civil fusion strategy give it immense potential for rapid wartime production. However, the NDRC leadership may face challenges in posturing China’s resources to support PLA requirements for large-scale combat operations, given competing demands for national economic recovery and development. Furthermore, despite its strong industrial capacity, China still relies on external sources for certain critical technologies (e.g., semiconductor manufacturing equipment), which could become a bottleneck in its supply chain during a conflict.
VII. War Potential
A. Human Resources and Personnel
United States
The total population of the United States is approximately 341.96 million, with 4.445 million people reaching military age. It has 1.328 million active military personnel and 799,500 reservists, totaling 2.127 million military personnel.
China
China’s total population is approximately 1.415 billion, with 19.81 million people reaching military age. It has 2.035 million active military personnel, 510,000 reservists, and 625,000 paramilitary forces, totaling 3.17 million military personnel.
B. Strategic Reserves (Energy and Food)
United States
The U.S. maintains the world’s largest Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), with an authorized storage capacity of 714 million barrels. The SPR is designed to mitigate the impact of oil supply disruptions and plays a key role in foreign policy. During World War II, the U.S. ensured energy independence by increasing oil production, establishing the Petroleum Administration for War, and building pipelines. The U.S. is also committed to energy transition, aiming for at least 25% of the Department of Defense’s energy to come from renewable sources by 2025.
In terms of food security, during World War II, the U.S. managed food production and distribution through government agencies, implemented rationing, and encouraged civilians to grow “Victory Gardens” to meet military needs and address labor shortages. The U.S. has a long history of combating global hunger and views humanitarian assistance as a vital component of national security.
China
China does not officially disclose its strategic petroleum reserve volume, but estimates from 2016 suggested it held approximately 400 million barrels out of a total capacity of around 500 million barrels. Reports indicate China is accelerating the build-up of strategic reserves to prepare for future wars or international sanctions. China’s energy mix primarily relies on domestic coal, and domestic and foreign oil and gas, and it actively seeks to diversify supplies to reduce reliance on Middle Eastern oil.
Regarding food security, China prioritizes “ensuring grain supply” and overall food security, with plans to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency by 2025. China has established the world’s largest food reserve system. Despite challenges like scarce arable land, water insufficiency, and environmental pollution, China is committed to increasing food production through advanced agricultural technologies and policy support. China has also revived a Mao-era food distribution system, which could provide an emergency logistics network in wartime.
C. Logistics and Supply Chain Capabilities
United States
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages nine critical supply chains and operates a global storage and distribution network. However, the U.S. military logistics system may face challenges in wartime, such as munitions consumption exceeding existing stockpiles, leading to “empty bins” issues. U.S. overseas logistics and resupply capabilities are crucial for sustaining its global power projection.
The U.S. defense industrial base’s supply chain reliance on global sources, particularly for critical raw materials and components, poses significant risks that could be exploited or disrupted in a conflict. The U.S. is working to strengthen supply chain resilience through investments in domestic manufacturing and strategic industrial policies, and by collaborating with allies and partners. However, this transformation takes time and cannot fully address all vulnerabilities in the short term.
China
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to project and sustain combat power depends on its logistics capabilities, systems, and processes. China is expanding its inventory of long-range assets, such as heavy transport aircraft and logistics ships, to support long-range deployments of aircraft carriers and other surface combatants. China has established its first overseas base in Djibouti and is seeking more overseas logistics points to support naval operations.
The U.S.-China trade war has posed significant challenges to global supply chains and the logistics industry, leading to sharp declines in shipping volumes, increased complexity, and risks. Chinese companies are reshaping their supply chain strategies, seeking alternative locations and considering “near-shoring” or “friend-shoring” models to enhance resilience and transparency. However, the lack of clear negotiation prospects leads to long-term uncertainty, hindering long-term investments in logistics infrastructure and supply chain optimization. In a “hot war,” China’s heavy reliance on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) is a potential vulnerability, as naval blockades could force diversions, increasing transportation costs and risks.
D. Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities
United States
Cyber warfare poses a significant threat to the joint force, requiring preparation to counter such threats. The U.S. Department of Defense focuses on infrastructure supporting space systems missions. The U.S. leads in satellite dominance, but China is gaining ground through quantum technology and cyber espionage. The U.S. is developing the “Golden Dome for America” missile defense system, a multi-layered, space-integrated system designed to protect the U.S. homeland from advanced aerial threats.
Cyberattacks can impact production lines, shutting them down and affecting real-world DoD missions. Building cyber resilience in the U.S. defense industrial base is crucial. Furthermore, the U.S. military’s heavy reliance on its space architecture makes it an attractive target for the PLA, further reducing the effectiveness of space deterrence. China is actively developing anti-satellite weapons, including ground-based lasers and co-orbital satellites capable of “dogfighting” or physically removing other satellites from orbit, posing a “grave threat” to the U.S.
China
China possesses active cyberattack and defense capabilities. The PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) integrates cyber intelligence, defense, and attack capabilities. China is rapidly developing space warfare capabilities to destroy U.S. satellites in a future conflict and assist in conducting long-range attacks. China’s advancements in space-based capabilities have increased its reliance on them, leading to greater concern about irresponsible kinetic testing.
China views cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare and actively uses cyber tools for espionage and to preposition for disruptive operations. The PLA believes that by prolonging a conflict and targeting U.S. alliance networks, it can blunt U.S. technological advantages. PLA researchers assess that the U.S. defense industrial base cannot sustain a protracted war and that the margin of U.S. technological superiority will diminish as a war continues. China’s defense mobilization system offers advantages in such a conflict.
E. Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Doctrine
United States
The U.S. possesses nuclear deterrence capabilities, and its nuclear doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, including in response to an invasion or attack on its own or allied territory. The U.S. is developing hypersonic missiles capable of carrying strategic payloads (including nerve agents and nuclear weapons) that can strike targets with extreme speed and maneuverability. The U.S. is developing space-based interceptors and layered defense capabilities to counter hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missile threats.
China
China officially adheres to a “no first use” (NFU) nuclear policy, meaning it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction unless attacked by them. However, U.S. defense analysts contend that China is shifting away from a strict NFU strategy towards a “launch on warning” (LOW) posture, which would allow it to retaliate upon detection of incoming warheads without waiting for them to strike Chinese targets first. China is constructing 320 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and developing new ICBM variants and advanced strategic delivery systems. China has also expanded its dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile force and is refitting its Type 094 ballistic missile submarines to carry the longer-range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Additionally, China has recently reassigned an operational nuclear mission to some of its bombers, equipped with air-launched ballistic missiles that might have nuclear capability. China possesses the “world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal,” including the DF-17 and DF-27, capable of flying at over Mach 5 and maneuvering to evade missile defense systems.
The modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal is accelerating and expanding. The Pentagon estimates that China’s nuclear warhead stockpile will reach around 600 by 2025 and exceed 1,000 by 2030. The expansion of China’s nuclear forces aims to provide greater escalation control and deter U.S. intervention.
F. Overall Combat Capability and Adaptability
United States
The U.S. military possesses unparalleled global reach and technological superiority, serving as a pillar of Western military doctrine. The U.S. maintains an unmatched advantage in air power, with a total aircraft count (13,043) far exceeding China’s (3,309). While the U.S. Navy has been surpassed by China in terms of ship numbers, it operates 11 aircraft carriers compared to China’s 2. The U.S. has significant advantages in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems.
However, the current state of the U.S. defense industrial base reflects policymakers’ preference for “just-in-time” supply chains and lowest-cost contracts, which limits its ability to rapidly surge production in a major conflict. The U.S.’s reliance on China for critical mineral supply chains is a significant vulnerability that could impact its ability to manufacture advanced military systems.
China
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing unprecedented military modernization, developing a large and advanced arsenal of nuclear, conventional, cyber, and space capabilities. The PLA Navy (PLAN) is the world’s largest navy by fleet size, with over 370 combat vessels, projected to reach 395 by 2025. China surpasses the U.S. in land forces, tanks, and artillery numbers. China is rapidly advancing in cutting-edge technologies such as AI, hypersonics, advanced missiles, and space-based capabilities.
China’s military modernization is supported by a world-class defense industrial base, making it nearly self-sufficient in shipbuilding and the production of various naval combatants. However, the PLA lacks recent combat experience, and its maintenance capabilities for high-intensity operations are untested in real combat. China still relies on external sources for critical high-tech areas such as aero-engines and advanced semiconductors.
VIII. Conclusion
In a hypothetical “hot war” scenario, both the United States and China possess unique national power advantages and significant vulnerabilities that would profoundly influence the course and outcome of the conflict.
The United States’ strengths lie in its robust network of allies and global influence, enabling it to forge broad international coalitions and project power worldwide. The depth of its financial markets and the dollar’s status as a reserve currency provide immense financing capabilities, though rising national debt could be a long-term constraint. The U.S. maintains a lead in technological innovation, particularly in AI and advanced military technologies. However, the primary challenges for the U.S. are its domestic political polarization, which could undermine national unity and the ability to sustain public support in a prolonged conflict. Furthermore, the hollowing out of its manufacturing base and reliance on global supply chains make it vulnerable to supply disruptions in wartime.
China’s strengths are its vast industrial production capacity, as the global manufacturing hub, capable of rapidly producing military and civilian goods on a large scale. Its highly centralized political system allows for swift decision-making and resource mobilization. China dominates in critical mineral resources like rare earths and is actively developing energy and food strategic reserves to enhance self-sufficiency. Additionally, China is rapidly advancing in cyber and space warfare capabilities and possesses a world-leading hypersonic missile arsenal. However, China’s vulnerabilities include its economic structure’s reliance on exports, making it susceptible to economic shocks from sanctions and blockades, which could trigger internal social unrest. Its financial system, while state-controlled, faces deep structural issues like a real estate crisis and local government debt. Moreover, its reliance on external sources for certain high-end technologies (e.g., advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment and aero-engines) and the potential for insufficient internal feedback mechanisms due to information control could limit its adaptability and resilience in a prolonged, complex conflict.
In conclusion, a “hot war” between the U.S. and China would be extremely costly, likely resulting in immense economic, social, and human casualties for both sides. The duration of such a conflict could extend beyond traditional expectations, with an ever-present risk of nuclear escalation. Both nations would attempt to exploit each other’s weaknesses; for instance, the U.S. might target China’s export-oriented economy and technological dependencies through economic sanctions and supply chain disruptions, while China might seek to undermine U.S. industrial and military production by restricting critical mineral exports and leveraging cyber/space warfare capabilities. Ultimately, the trajectory of the conflict would depend on each side’s ability to effectively leverage its core strengths while mitigating its inherent vulnerabilities.
数据让我们能够以前所未有的清晰度观察事物，但要获得数据的好处就需要改变外交政策的制定方式。 2023 年 6 月 19 日 晚上 11:00 作者：美国退役四星将军、Rhombus Power 顾问 Stanley McChrystal和Rhombus Power 创始人兼首席执行官 Anshu Roy 。
